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WASHINGTON CASE LAW

The same fate befell a disfavored driver who was cross-complaining
in Cramer v. Bock 2 ° because, "her own testimony is that she noticed
its speed from the time she saw it to her right and was at all times
acquainted with its speed as it approached the intersection."'"
The present state of the law is that a disfavored driver may be deceived by the speed at which a favored driver is approaching, but not
if he is a good judge of speed or knows that the other's speed is excessive. The law as it now stands puts a premium upon bad judgment
and careless observation. Carelessness frees a disfavored driver from
contributory negligence instead of charging him with it. It seems more
reasonable to follow Judge Rosellini's suggestion that a disfavored
driver should never be allowed to claim that he was deceived solely by
the speed of the favored driver.
ROBERT L. BEALE

Interspousal Immunity-The Effects of Community Property and
Fraud. The Washington position on interspousal tort immunity should
be reconsidered in view of two recent California decisions, Self v. Self,,
and Klein v. Klein.'
The Self case involved an assault by a husband upon his wife while
the couple were living together. The court overruled its longstanding
immunity doctrine3 and allowed the wife to recover.
Having created its own authority in Self, the court proceeded to decide the companion case, Klein, which was a negligence action by a
wife against her husband. By washing the exterior deck of his pleasure
boat with water, he made a slippery and unsafe walking surface upon
which his wife fell while she was helping him to clean the boat. Here,
too, the marital relationship existed at the time of the tort.
Washington's position on interspousal immunity as compared to the
California court's complete abrogation of immunity is illustrated by
Goode v. Martinis,' in which the husband, during the interim between
commencement and completion of divorce and while the couple were
legally separated, revisited the wife and sexually assaulted her. The
Washington court indicated by the tenor of its language that it may be
20 21

Wn.2d 13, 149 P.2d 525 (1944).

21 Id.at 16, 149 P2d at 527. Accord, Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co., 35 Wn.2d 97,

211 P.2d 160 (1949) ; Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn.2d 217, 95 P2d 791 (1939).
126 Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P2d 65 (1962).
226 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962).
3 Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909).
4 58 Wn.2d 229, 361 P2d 941 (1961), 37 WASH. L. REv. 233 (1962).
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willing to abolish interspousal immunity in this state. However, the
court evidently did not believe that Goode was the proper case for that
drastic departure. Though the wife was allowed to recover, the decision was expressly confined to the facts.
In Goode, though the marriage was not yet ended, divorce proceedings had begun and the couple were legally separated. In addition
a property settlement had been made, thus negating the effects of community property law on immunity. Self, on the other hand, presents
a situation where the assault took place during the existence not only
of marriage, but also of cohabitation. Klein, a case where the California court dispenses with immunity in a negligence situation, goes one
step beyond Goode and Self (because of the nature of the tort and its
occurrence during a normal marital relationship).
It is important to note, as well, that the California court expressly
overruled its decisions sustaining interspousal immunity. In contrast
the Washington court only stated that the facts of Goode did not
support a decision upholding immunity upon the narrow ground of the
women's emancipation statute.' Schultz v. Christopher,6 the only prior
Washington interspousal immunity case, had been decided on that
basis.
As the discussion in the Klein opinion illustrates, many reasons have
been advanced for denying to spouses the right to sue each other in
tort. For example:
1) A spouse has resort to divorce proceedings.
2) He has a form of remedy in criminal prosecution.
3) At common law the husband and wife were considered a unit.
4) The wife is legally incapacitated for the policy reason that to
allow a tort suit is disruptive of marital harmony.
5) A suit arising from one of closest human relationships conduces
to the perpetration of fraud on the courts.
6) In community property states the cause of action and the recovery are community property rather than separate property of the
injured spouse.
Since a recent note7 has discussed the first four reasons, this note
5 RCW 26.16.160.

665 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911).
7 See Note, 37 WASi. L. REv. 233 (1962).
effect of the
26.16.160. He
aggregate. If
the California

There the writer also discusses the
Washington statutes: RCW 26.16.130, RCW 26.16.150 and RCW
encourages a liberal interpretation of these three statutes read in the
this is done the result in Washington must necessarily be the same as
court reached in Self.
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is limited in scope to the effects of fraud and community property on
interspousal tort immunity.
Intentional torts excepted, the question of fraud presents a difficult
problem. In the Self wife-beating case, the California court found
unconvincing the argument that the husband and wife would collude
to defraud the court. This view is realistic, since the animosities surrounding a beating minimize the likelihood that the spouses would be
compatible enough to collude. The Washington court in Goode also
rejected the collusion argument, but for the reason that the tort did
not appear to be covered by insurance. The Self rationale seems
equally valid and of wider applicability.
Klein, however, presented a situation where a negligent tort occurred
between persons intimately related, so that the opportunity for fraud
was at its maximum. In full awareness of this possibility the California
court answered that the basic principle of the law of torts is that a
person injured by another's willful or negligent conduct should be
compensated unless a statute or compelling public policy dictates
otherwise. Finding neither, the court concluded that the opportunity
for fraud and collusion does not warrant denial of compensation as a
matter of law. Since in the court's opinion fraud and collusion are
possible in every case, final reliance has to be placed upon the courts
and their ability to detect unmeritorious claims. The alternative is to
deny all types of claims because of the fraud possibility.
To support its conclusions the California court cited and quoted
from a Washington case, Borst v. Borst.' That case allowed a child a
cause of action for negligent injury to him by his parent except for
injuries occurring during the performance of parental duties. The
California court found a close analogy to the husband-wife situation,
warranting the application of Borst on the question of fraud. Accordingly, it accepted this reasoning from the Borst case:
Courts will not immunize tort feasors from liability in a whole class of
cases because of the possibility of fraud, but will depend upon the
legislature to deal with the problem as one of a question of public
policyY

Evidently the Washington court means that some policy questions
are much more effectively dealt with by the legislature, since that body
was structured to hear the views of all divergent interests, and can
take the time and manpower to make a careful, detailed study of the
8 41 Wn.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).

9Id.at 654, 251 P.2d 149, 155 (1952).
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problem. But, if a court denies recovery to a spouse because it anticipates fraud in future cases, it does so entirely on the basis of intuition 0
and without hearing from all the interests affected. Notably, insurance
companies" would not be heard from, nor would their opponents.
It has been argued that if immunity is properly a legislative question, then the legislature ought to initiate any change in the present
law of immunity. In Borst the Washington court met this argument
by stating that injury due to another's fault should be compensated,
and, if this requires that liability be extended, the court is quite capable
of doing so, because "where the proposal is to open the doors of the
court rather than close them, the courts are quite competent to act
for themselves."' 2
In Illinois the court abrogated interspousal immunity.' It believed
that, where there is insurance, the insurance company is the real defendant and that fraud is simply an additional risk to be insured
against. But the insurance groups of that state then succeeded in
convincing the legislature of the seriousness of fraud in the interspousal tort suit, and as a result immunity was re-established by
statute.' This succession of events aptly demonstrates the workability
of the rationale adopted in Borst and Klein.
The argument for immunity is strongest in a community property
state like Washington, where the recovery for a spouse's personal injury is community rather than separate property. In California the
10 Courts have undertaken a determination of policy for which they are not ideally
suited. For example, in Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955), the Oregon
court, relying only upon intuition, concluded that the insurance company would be
without a voice and thus adversely affected by husband and wife negligence suits. See
McCurdy, PersonalInjury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL L. REv. 303 (1959), which
explains that a substantial number of states have allowed interspousal actions for
negligent injury for many years. Nevertheless, not even the most affected (and consequently the most interested) parties, the insurance companies, can demonstrate the
extent of interspousal claims or the extent of suspected marital collusion. If liability
insurers thought it worthwhile, one would think they would collect such information.
Professor McCurdy concludes that "questions of policy should not be injected and
determined (by the courts) by purely a priori conceptions." Id. at 337.
11 New York has one solution. In 1937, that state amended its Domestic Relations
Law to allow interspousal rights of action in tort. Concurrently, the Insurance Law
was amended to prohibit issuance of a liability insurance policy to cover injuries to
the person or property of an insured's spouse, unless expressly included in the policy.
N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57 (1937), and N. Y. Ins. Law § 167 (3) (1937).
1241 Wn.2d 642, 657, 251 P.2d 149, 157 (1952).
Once the court has extended
liability by disposing of immunity, the evidence of successful fraudulent claims through
the courts may begin to appear. At that time legislative action becomes appropriate.
The host-guest statutes are an example of this law-making process. In the host-guest
situation the insurance companies were being oppressed by the great number of
fraudulent claims which were successful in court. The insurance groups took action
and succeeded in convincing the legislatures of the need for limited liability. See RCW
46.08.080.
13 Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill.
503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
14 ILL. REv. STAT. Cx. 68 § 1 (1953).
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problem no longer exists because a statute provides that "all damages,
special and general awarded a married person in a civil action for
personal injuries are the separate property of such person."' 5 In the
Self opinion the California court emphasized the effect of this statute.
It found this statute to be the final and most convincing elucidation of
public policy in favor of abrogating interspousal immunity, although
the primary reason for the legislative change was to abolish the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence' 6 and its attendant hardships.
Before the statute's enactment in 1957, it was somewhat incongruous
to let the wife sue the husband for a personal tort since the recovery
was community property, controlled and managed by the husband.'Also there was circuity of action, 8 since damages recovered by a wife
from her husband might have been payable from his separate property,
but the recovery was community property in which the husband had
a half interest.
To avoid the same difficulties the Washington community property
statute must either be amended in the California fashion or given a
different judicial interpretation.' In any event, the present situation
is unfair to injured spouses.
From an analytic property viewpoint it is incorrect to consider
damages received for personal injury to one spouse as community
property. The basis for the proper rationale is that except for gifts
clearly made to the community, community property only consists of
'5

CAL. Crv. CODE § 163.5 (1957).

For a discussion of the effect of this statute see

Note 45 CAL. L. REv. 779 (1957) ; Comment, 9 HASTINGs L.J. 291 (1958). Louisiana
at present has statutes which designate the personal injury damages of the wife as
her separate property. LA. CiV. CODE: ANN. art. 2334, 2402 (West 1952). Texas had
a similar statute, TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANNO. art. 4615 (Vernon's 1960), but this
statute was held unconstitutional in Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 278 S.W2d 407
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
1' Zarogoza v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202 P2d 73 (1949). The same unjust situation exists in Washington. In Ostheller v. Spokane Inland Empire Ry. Co., 107 Wash.
678, 182 Pac. 630 (1919), the wife's administrator attempted to recover from Railroad Co., which had caused husband's and wife's deaths. The court held that the
defunct community could not benefit from the husband's contributory negligence and
that the wife's recovery, which was community property, was barred. However, should
the wife suffer death at her husband's hands she (or at least her personal representative) is in a better position than if she survives because then the administrator
or executor can recover from the husband since the imputed negligence defense is
inapplicable. Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn2d 419, 275 P2d 723 (1954).
'17RCW 26.16.030.
1826 Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65, 69 n.5 (1962).
19 While such interpretation is justified by the policy considerations discussed in the
text, the court may hesitate when confronted with the formidable task of overturning
numerous past decisions of a closely related nature, including not only interspousal
immunity, Schultz v. Christopher 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911) ; but also imputed contributory negligence, Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire Ry. Co. 107
Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630 (1919); and personal injury suits against third parties,
Schneider v. Biberger, 76 Wash. 504, 136 Pac. 701 (1913).
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that which is acquired by onerous title,2" in other words, that property
which through their labor or industry the spouses have acquired together. Recovery for personal injury does not fall within that definition. But the Washington court, when first confronted with the problem,21 noted that the recovery was not by "gift, bequest, devise or
descent ' 2 2 and concluded that it had to be community property. This
interpretation fails to take into account the principle of onerous title.
Since the onerous title doctrine has subsequently been recognized 23
the court should be able to apply it in the personal injury case.24
Another anomaly exists by virtue of the Washington interpretation
of the community property statute. To the extent that one has property rights in his own body, those rights before marriage are undoubtedy "separate property."25 Yet, when injury occurs after marriage, the cause of action, since it is a chose-in-action not acquired by
20 DE FUNIAX, COMIUNITY PROPERTY §§ 82, 83, 151 (1943).
Under the principle
of onerous title, community property includes only property acquired by the spouses'
joint labor and industry. See also Zaragoza v. Craven 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73
(1949) (dissenting opinion). Washington recognizes the onerous title doctrine. In
Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn.2d 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948), a case where husband and
wife had been separated for over ten years, the court had to decide if bonds purchased
by the husband during this separation were separate property. It held they were,
because "the whole theory of community property is that it is obtained by the efforts
of the husband and wife or both for the benefit of the community." Id. at 852. This
onerous title theory has been reaffirmed. In Re Armstrong's Estate, 33 Wn.2d 118,
204 P.2d 500 (1944). In that case property was received four days after an interlocutory order was entered. The court said that this was separate property since the
widow had not contributed to its acquisition nor was it acquired by the joint efforts
of the decedent and the widow.
21 Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021 (1892).
22 RCW 26.16.010.
23 See note 19 supra.
24 Even though the court may not wish to reinterpret its holding under the statute,
other methods of solution are possible. See Jacob, The Law of Community Property
in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L.J. 1, 42 (1931) where three methods are advanced whereby
through property analysis the present difficulty can be circumvented: "(1) If the husband fails to defend a community property interest the wife may do so . . . But this
still involves us in the difficulty that after recovery the husband shall have management and control of the damages recovered because of his own tort.
"2) A second and very simple solution . . . would be to say that recovery in tort
for injury to the wife by her husband and another is to be regarded as separate
property. The weakness in this solution is, first, it is difficult to find a source in
separate property to which the wife's damages are attributable, and second, that such
damages have always been called community property.
"3) The third possible solution is to say that damages are community property;
that their source is the loss of earning power of the wife; that the wife's earnings,
though community property, are subject to her management and control; and that
where her husband has disqualified himself, by his conduct, to control the money
recovered as damages, that that money is to be subject to the wife's management and
control as its source was."
25 Foote v. Foote, 170 Cal. App. 2d 435, 339 P.2d 188 (1959), is authority for this
proposition in California. Here a wife recovered from her husband for a pre-marital
tort because the cause of action was her separate property and the recovery retained
that character. In reality there is no property right in a body. However a person's
interest in keeping his body intact falls within the broad definition of property as
embracing "every interest . . . which the law regards of sufficient value to obtain
judicial recognition." York v. Stone, 178 Wash. 280, 285, 34 P.2d 911, 913.
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one of the privileged means, 26 is community property. But property

acquired before marriage is separate property and remains separate
property after marriage. 7 "Community property" in a person's limbs
is, then, an illogical exception to the usual property rules. Such a
result is particularly incomprehensible since it fails to consider that
compensation is given because an interest has been invaded, and the
interest here is the individual's right to personal security. Allowing
the wife to recover in her own right would merely restore her to the
status quo ante. It is true that the community can suffer a loss of
services due to the wife's injury, for which loss compensation to the
community should be allowed when it is inflicted by a third party.2 9
This community interest, however, should not be confused with the
wife's interest which, when invaded, should allow her to recover as an
individual for her own pain, suffering and disfigurement."0 Here interest in her body's security was her separate "property" before marriage, and marriage did not change its nature. Since property acquired
with separate property is itself separate, the damages received in exRCW 26.16.010.
Kinman v. Roberts, 151 Wash. 35, 274 Pac. 719 (1929). See RCW 26.16.020.
28 This argument has been made previously. Horowitz, Conflicts of Laws in Colnmunity Property, 11 WAsHr. L. REv. 121, (pts. 1-2) 212, 229 (1936). See also Comment, 1 WAsH. L. Rav. 129 (1926).
29 Lindsay v. Oregon Shortline Ry. Co., 13 Idaho 477, 90 Pac. 984 (1907), where
the court gives the community a cause of action for injuries to wife. This is for loss
of wife's services to the community. The court then erroneously gave the husband a
cause of action for the wife's suffering as was done at common law. Strict, proper
application of community property principles would have given the wife the cause of
action as her own separate property. See note 20 supra.
Washington allows a split cause of action for injuries to a minor, one to the minor
for pain and suffering and permanent injuries, and one to the parents for loss of the
child's services during minority. Harris v. Puget Sound Electric R. Co., 52 Wash.
289, 100 Pac. 838 (1909). Certainly no policy considerations exist for denying a
similar split cause of action to the community and to the wife. Of course, in an interspousal suit the community should be denied recovery because the husband as a member
of the community would get back an interest in part of what he is required to pay out.
30In Fox Tucson Theatres Corp. v. Lindsay, 47 Ariz. 388, 56 P.2d 183 (1963),
although the court considered the damages for personal injury to the wife as community property, it made this reply to the defendant's objection that the wife could
not substitute herself as plaintiff for the husband who died while the trial was pending: "[D]efendant has overlooked the reason for the rule [making husband necessary
plaintiff] and the capacity in which he is plaintiff. It is not because a cause of action
ever existed in him, for it belonged to the person who was injured. As was said in
C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260, 4 Am. Rep. 606, 'the injury did not accrue to
the husband,' it was wholly personal to the wife. It was her body that was bruised;
it was she who suffered the agonizing mental and physical pain. The husband merely
26

27

represents the community as a guardian. . .

."

Id. at 389, 54 P.2d at 184.

The Washington court has expressed similar views. In O'Toole v. Faulkner, 34
Wash. 371, 75 Pac. 975 (1904), the wife sustained permanent disability and the
husband died. The court said of the damages for the disability: "[T]he community
being dead when this suit was brought, it may be doubted if it was such an entity
as could be continued through an administration for the purpose of sharing in the
unliquidated and unrecovered damages for the continuing lifetime disabilities of a
surviving member." Id. at 373, 75 Pac. at 976. In truth the community had ceased to
exist in this instance, but the court recognized the extreme unfairness in allowing
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change for the spouses' individual right of personal security ought to
be separate property.
In Washington a wife may have some basis for a claim if she argues
that her personal security is her own right for which she should be allowed to recover. Once she has established her right to sue, Stephens
v. Depue3 ' would say that "whether . . . the damages will belong to
her or the community is immaterial to us." 2 In that case the court
allowed a wife to recover for alienation of affections, although she was
living with her husband when the tort occurred and at the time of
suit. Once this right to sue for damages without joining her husband
had been established, the court said "[S]he has the concomitant sole
right to satisfy and discharge any judgment in her favor." The court
refused to decide whether the recovery was community property,
stating that it would have been a prejudgment of title. Thus the effect
of this decision would seem to be that if a wife overcomes common law
reasons for immunity, she can sue, satisfy, and discharge the judgment
in her favor without encountering any community property difficulties.
Literally read, this case would mean that what she recovers is hers in
return for the injury she has suffered. 3 If this is true for alienation
of affections, where the marital rights in companionship are affected, it
should be no less true when the rights of personal security are invaded.
Community property law presents a major obstacle to abrogation
of interspousal tort immunity in Washington. The result which the
court has reached seems contrary to the underlying philosophy of the
community property system since
If it is once granted that a wife may sue her husband, it would be a
strange thing to say that the property statutes enacted for the wife's
protection, should have the effect of making her remediless.34
the community to recover part of the damages to the wife. The unfairness is equally
great when the wife is barred from suing her husband because the recovery is community property.
In Wampler v. Beinert, 125 Wash. 494, 216 Pac. 855 (1923), the court expressed
in even clearer language that the injury accrues to the wife: "The injury to the wife
is not alone an injury to the community but to the wife personally, and this injury may
be endured long after the community is dissolved." See also Zarogoza v. Craven, 33
Cal.,2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
31 151 Wash. 641, 276 Pac. 882 (1929).
32 Id.
at 652, 276 Pac. 882, 889 (1929) : Holly St. Land Co. v. Beyer, 48 Wash.
422, 93 Pac. 1066 (1908).
33 In California this possibility existed by virtue of Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal.
App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945), holding that, while for property of this character,
the cause of action could be community, the recovery might be separate property.
Zarogoza v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949) overruled Franklin. The
court stated: "[I1t must be considered that the cause of action for personal injuries
suffered by either spouse during marriage . . .as well as the recovery therefore constitute community property . . . and any contrary implications of the Franklin case
are disapproved." Id. at 320, 202 P.2d at 76.
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Were the Klein and Self cases argued to the Washington court, together with the substantial reasons supporting them, it is possible that
Washington too would abrogate interspousal tort immunity."
KENNETH 0. JARVI

Monopoly-Medical Services. Washington has been recognized as
one of the leading state jurisdictions in which a private organization
or party may acquire relief from monopolistic practices of voluntary
medical associations.' A recent case seems to broaden the available
grounds upon which such associations may be subjected to liability.!
The case also appears to provide some guides for the interpretation
of the recently enacted Consumer Protection Act.8
Dr. Hubbard, a licensed physician in Spokane County brought an
action for damages and injunctive relief upon the cancellation of his
contract by the defendant Medical Service Corporation of Spokane
County (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) and his automatic
termination of membership in defendant Medical Service Bureau of
Spokane County (hereinafter referred to as the bureau). The plaintiff
alleged that the operation of the corporation and bureau constituted
a monopoly in violation of the WAsH. CONST. art. 12, § 22. Finding
that the corporation's operation was not a monopoly the trial court
refused to award damages. It did, however, restrain the defendants
from enforcing certain policies concerning payment for X-rays and
from prohibiting industrial plant doctors from accepting plant employees as private patients.
On appeal by Dr. Hubbard and cross appeal by the corporation and
bureau, the supreme court upheld the trial court's findings concerning
monopoly and the propriety of cancelling the contract between the
defendant and the corporation. The court nevertheless dissolved the
injunction concerning the above-mentioned policies, on the ground
that the plaintiff had no identifiable legal interest in determining the
bureau's policy in these matters.4 The court then found that the refusal
34

Jacob, supra note 24, at 42 (1931).
35 Alaska does not have the community property problem, but the Alaska court
recently relied upon Self and Kleh in a decision of first impression refusing to
establish the immunity, Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963).
1 See Editorial Note, Expulsion and Exclusion From Hospital Practice and Organized Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERs L. REv. 327, 347 (1961).
2 Hubbard v. The Medical Serv. Corp., 59 Wn2d 449, 367 P2d 1003 (1962).
3 Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 216.
4 Here the court cites with approval Porter v. King County Medical Soc'y, 186
Wash. 410, 58 P.2d 367 (1936). The Porter case would appear to be easily avoided

